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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
A  major objective of developing country governments and of donor agencies,
stated repeatedly in their policy documents and speeches, is achieving greater
equity in health.  Chile's constitution, for example, states that the government has
an obligation to "protect free and egalitarian access to actions that promote,
protect, restore health and rehabilitate the health status of individuals" (Ministry
of Health, 1992).  The World Health Organization's most recent report on
implementation of "Health for All by the Year 2000" concludes by advocating a new
policy framework for "ensuring equity in health through more effective inter-
sectoral health promotion and protection; and pursuing equality in access to primary
health care..." (WHO, 1992). 
This concern for achieving greater equity in health is based largely the
view, now widely held in most societies, that everyone should have access to basic
health care independent of their ability to pay for it.
1  Put another way, the
tolerance level for inequality in health is lower in most societies than the
tolerance level for inequality in income.  It is probably lower than the tolerance
level for inequalities in education, too, since differences in health are so much
more, literally, a matter of life and death.
But the reality in virtually every society is far different from the apparent
objective: the poor die earlier and more often.  In this paper, we aim to show that
this cruel reality is not that surprising: it is the predictable outcome of the
usual alignment of economic and political forces, which like a powerful ocean
current, constrains the extent to which public resources can and will go to the
poor.  Awareness of this powerful current should not, however, be a cause for
pessimism and inaction.  On the contrary, awareness is the only sensible starting
point for designing and implementing realistic policies and programs to swim against
the tide.
The first issue we face is the measure of equity itself.  There is no
agreement on how to measure equity: whether by actual health outcomes across
different groups, by utilization of services, or by access itself -- and there are
currently few data for any of these measures, within or across countries.  We argue
that the simplest and most useful measures of equity from a policy-making point of
view are access and public expenditures; these measures are conservative, in that
they generally register less inequality than do indicators of health outcomes
(Section 1).  We then review what little evidence there is within countries on
equity using these measures (Section 2); and discuss why public policies in health
(as well as in education) usually favor the wealthy at the expense of the poor
(Section 3).  We close (Section 4) with an analysis of the cases of certain
                        
     
1 It may also stem, of course, from the growing recognition that better health care can accelerate
economic growth by improving productivity at work and learning in school, and can help reduce poverty
directly and indirectly. In this paper, we start from the premise that there is also an independent
political and social objective of achieving equity. 2
countries that have achieved a more equitable distribution of public resources for
health, and identify some lessons for reform strategies elsewhere.
Section 1. Measuring Equity in Health Section 1. Measuring Equity in Health Section 1. Measuring Equity in Health Section 1. Measuring Equity in Health
For most policy-makers and for the general public, "improving equity" means
working toward greater equality in health outcomes or status among all the
individuals in a country, regardless of the income group to which they belong.  Such
equality is far from being a reality in developing countries today -- on the
contrary, health status differs dramatically according to income level.  In
Indonesia, India, and Kenya child mortality is higher in states or provinces with
larger proportions of poor people.  Within cities, there are large differences in
child survival between rich and poor neighborhoods (see Figure 1).  In Madurai, the
second largest city in India's Tamil Nadu State, children in the poorest households
were more than twice as likely to suffer from serious physical or mental
disabilities as children from slightly better-off households.  In Porto Alegre,
Brazil, child mortality in poor households in 1980 was twice the level for wealthier
families. 
Differences in health outcomes across income groups, however, are likely to
exaggerate differences in inputs of public resources across income groups to health.
  Health outcomes are in fact "produced" by households, using a combination of
inputs, including benefits of public health services but also housing, food and
nutrition, sanitation practices, exercise, smoking and other habits, and so on. 
Many of these inputs are in turn related to the education of household members; many
are accidental inputs to health in that other objectives may largely govern their
use or lack of use.  For many reasons, high-income households are likely to
"produce" more and better health than low-income households, since their members
tend to be better educated and with higher income can purchase more food and better
water and sanitation.
2  In high-income countries in some periods, the very rich,
with more obesity and smoking, may have suffered some health disadvantages.  But
today, with more widespread understanding of how health is produced, the rich
virtually everywhere combine more education and more income with better access to
information about the causes of good health to ensure better health outcomes than
the poor enjoy -- and this would be true even were there no systematic difference
across income groups in access to health services per se.  Indeed, in a few
countries the rich may not rely on public services at all, instead purchasing
medical services directly from private providers.  In these countries, even if all
public resources for health were spent entirely on the poor, the rich could still
end up with better health outcomes.
If the problem with measuring differences by health outcome is that many
other factors affect outcomes besides health services, why not measure outcomes once
individuals are sick?  Do individuals with the same health problems fare
systematically differently depending on their income?  Again, there is strong
evidence of major gaps between rich and poor in developing countries in treatment
for identical health conditions.  In rural parts of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Peru,
individuals in rich and poor households have roughly equal chances of being ill at
any given time; but of those who fall ill, individuals in wealthy families are about
twice as likely to obtain care (see Table 1) (Baker and van der Gaag, 1993).  In
rural Peru in 1984, children in families in which the mother had secondary or
university education (with education status closely correlated with income) were 3-6
                        
     
2 Behrman (1988) presents an economic model that incorporates the household production of health.3
times more likely to be vaccinated than in families in which the mother had no
education (see Table 2) (Musgrove, 1986).
These measures are also, unfortunately, likely to exaggerate differences
across income groups in access to health care.  Even for a given sickness, the poor
are less likely to acknowledge they are sick; when sickness is acknowledged the poor
are still less likely to use available services than the rich.
3  The tendency of the
poor to minimize sickness (or of the rich to exaggerate it) is generally assumed to
reflect different expectations of what is normal and of the efficacy of individual
actions.  The tendency of the poor to utilize available services less, even when
sickness is acknowledged, is not surprising since use of services, even if the
services themselves are free, usually involves other costs, e.g. time lost from work
and transportation.   In short, for reasons that have nothing to do with health
services, the poor are less able to "produce" good health outcomes, and less likely
to utilize health services that are available to them.  These two realities lead to
two conclusions:
                        
     
3 Baker and Van der Gaag (1992) report systematic differences in the extent to which different
income groups report sickness, using data from household surveys in several different countries. 
Though not new, their finding of the same pattern in different countries is convincing.  It is also
well-known that women are systematically less likely to report themselves sick than are men --another
apparent instance of differences across groups.
 Differences in health outcomes across income groups exaggerate
differences in policy "effort" by an amount which is unknown and
changes over time.  Therefore measures of equality in terms of public
resources, to be comparable over time or across countries, must be
restricted to simple measures of public expenditures per person or of
physical access, independent of demand. Such measures also have the
advantage of being relatively conservative, i.e., they minimize
inequality.
 At the same time, it is clear that equality in health outcomes requires
much higher public spending on the poor per person than on the rich.4
The second point has interesting implications for policy.  For example, the
World Bank's 1993 World Development Report places substantial emphasis on the point
that many factors outside the health sector, especially household income and
education, influence health outcomes.
4  At the same time, the Report concludes that
countries can greatly improve health outcomes by making available a minimum package
of highly cost-effective public health and clinical services -- the costs of which
are not presumed to vary at all across households within countries nor across
countries (except for differences in supply costs).  The estimated costs ($12 in
low-income and $22 in middle-income countries) are underestimates to the extent they
are based on average costs of current supply, and fail to take into account the
additional costs of generating demand and subsidizing utilization by poor
households.
In the remainder of this paper, however, we focus on the first point:
comparable measures of health equity across countries, and the implications of this
more conservative measure of equity for policy.
Section 2. Evidence of Inequity: Public Expenditures and Physical Access Section 2. Evidence of Inequity: Public Expenditures and Physical Access Section 2. Evidence of Inequity: Public Expenditures and Physical Access Section 2. Evidence of Inequity: Public Expenditures and Physical Access
The increase in household surveys in the last two decades in developing
countries provides a rich new source of systematic data on differences in physical
access to health services for different income groups.  These data tell the same
story virtually everywhere: access to basic health care is unequal, with the poor
having much less access to simple, cost-effective services.  Data gathered through
the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Survey project (LSMS) show this result
for Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Peru (see Figures 2-4).  The differences between rich
and poor are most dramatic in Peru, where nearly two-thirds of low-income families
have to travel for more than an hour to reach a primary care provider; by contrast,
more than 95 percent of wealthy households are located less than half an hour from
their primary provider.  In Cote d'Ivoire, the disparities are also striking.  Even
in Ghana, where primary care centers are more widely distributed throughout the
country, about half of the poor are more than an hour from such facilities, compared
to less than 20 percent of the better-off.
Data on public expenditures can also provide a good measure of health equity.
 Early studies by Meerman on Malaysia (1979) and Selowsky on Colombia (1979) showed
how household survey data on utilization of services and household expenditures on
services could be used to study the incidence of public expenditures on health and
other public programs by income group.  While these studies discuss the role of
demand in utilization of services across income groups, estimations of public
subsidies nevertheless are based on utilization of services, a measure which is
highly sensitive to differing levels of demand.
Recent data from Indonesia show a highly skewed distribution of public monies
in 1990: the bottom 20 percent of households received only 12 percent of public
spending for health, while the top fifth obtained nearly 30 percent of public
expenditures (see Figure 5) (World Bank, 1993b).  As with the earlier studies,
however, these results reflect in part differences across income groups in the
demand for and use of publicly financed services.  A result from a 1991 national
household survey in Indonesia (Table 3) is more revealing: families in the top
                        
     
4 An entire chapter (Chapter 2) is devoted to this point.5
income deciles reside on average in areas where the density of primary care centers
and private doctors is 3 to 5 times greater than in areas inhabited by the poor.
During the 1980s the Government of Indonesia had made a major effort to
reduce even greater earlier inequities by building more health centers and health
posts in low-income areas of the country.  As a result, the share of the poor
falling ill in rural Java who used modern health providers (doctor, hospital,
primary care center, polyclinic, paramedic) had risen from 47 percent in 1978 to 55
percent a decade later.  Possibly because of the factors affecting health production
in the household, and demand for health services, however, the gap between rich and
poor remained large: the share of those from wealthy rural households falling ill
who used modern providers was nearly 73 percent in 1987.  And for Indonesia as a
whole, individuals in the highest rural income decile made more than twice as many
annual visits to modern providers than those living in the lowest decile (3.00
versus 1.41), including one and a half times as many visits to a primary health
center (1.17 versus 0.77) (van de Walle, 1992). 
Comprehensive national data on the incidence of government spending by income
groups is scarce.  Two data sets available (Costa Rica and Malaysia) show government
spending that favors the poor, but the more common pattern is of bias toward the
wealthy.
 In South Africa, public subsidies to the wealthiest 15 percent of
families covered by private health insurance, in the form of tax
relief, amounted in 1990 to nearly a fifth of all public spending for
health -- without counting direct government expenditures for the
wealthy (Broomberg, 1992).
 In Zambia, more than 20 percent of the Ministry of Health budget in the
late 1980s went to a single teaching hospital serving the population
of the capital city, whose inhabitants had incomes far above the
national average.
 In the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, nearly 27 percent of
the provincial health budget for 1991-92 was earmarked for two teaching
hospitals (Smithson, 1993).
 In Brazil in the mid-1980s, nearly 80 percent of all public spending
for health was devoted to largely curative, high-cost hospital care
concentrated in urban areas and especially in the affluent southern
part of the country.  Households in the top income quintile received
about 38 percent of public subsidies for health (McGreevey, 1988).
 In Peru in 1984, the Lima health region consumed nearly 47 percent of
the government's budget for patient-related care, even though the
relatively affluent capital region had only 32 percent of the country's
population (Musgrove, 1986).
 In many Latin American countries, ministry of health spending appears
to be fairly progressive because only the poor use subsidized
government health centers and hospitals.  But when this distributional
pattern is combined with the large public subsidies to social security-
based health care for the middle classes, total government expenditure6
for health is again weighted strongly toward the better-off (Mesa-Lago,
1991).
Recent analysis of data collected from household surveys in rural Kenya
(Dayton and Demery, 1994) tell a story similar to the one from Indonesia (see Figure
6).  Overall, the distribution of public subsidies to health care is regressive:
even within rural areas, the bottom quintile receives only 14 percent of the total
health subsidy, compared to 24 percent for the top rural quintile.  The average
subsidy for households in the bottom 10 percent of rural income is less than half
the subsidy for households in the top rural decile.  This skewed pattern is the
result of significantly higher use by the upper-income rural households of hospital-
based services, for which the unit subsidy is also much greater than for clinic or
dispensary-based care.  By contrast, the distribution of government health subsidies
through the lower-level facilities (health centers and dispensaries) shows a more
progressive pattern.  The incidence of health center subsidies, for example, is
estimated to be 24 percent for the bottom rural quintile and 13 percent for the top
rural quintile.
Data indicating disproportionately large hospital expenditures in major
cities do not necessarily signify inequity, for two reasons.  First, most such
expenditures potentially benefit all parts of the population, including the rural
poor who can in principle travel to exploit hospital care when their medical needs
require it.  Second, most of the most cost-effective health programs government can
finance do not require hospital stays.  Once all these cost-effective programs are
fully available to the entire population, they may reasonably take up only a small
portion of overall public spending -- and the remainder of such spending, for
critical referral care, may reasonably occur in urban hospitals and with high unit
costs could constitute a large portion of total spending.  However, wherever the
most basic services are not fully accessible to the rural poor -- as is the case in
Kenya, Pakistan, and Peru -- a high proportion of public resources going to urban
hospitals should suggest a problem of inequity.  Coupled with other information of
the type reported above, indicating lower demand and utilization of all kinds of
public health services among the poor, and much worse health outcomes among the
poor, the data on heavy concentrations of public spending on urban hospitals at the
least amount to a strong warning signal of inequity.
As mentioned above, data from Costa Rica and Malaysia show a different
pattern -- one of public expenditures favoring the poor.  In Costa Rica in 1986, 28
percent of government health spending accrued to the poorest fifth of households,
while just 11 percent went to the wealthiest quintile (World Bank, 1990).  Even when
these shares are adjusted for the fact that the average poor household had more
members than the average wealthy family, public spending for health still favored
the poor.  In Malaysia, data from both 1978 and 1990 show a similar continuing
progressive distribution of public funds for health (Meerman, 1982 and World Bank,
1992).  In Section 4 below, we examine some of the underlying factors that help to
explain this "pro-poor" bias in Costa Rica and Malaysia.
Section 3. The Politics of Inequity Section 3. The Politics of Inequity Section 3. The Politics of Inequity Section 3. The Politics of Inequity
5
The predominant pattern of unequal distribution of public resources for
health in developing countries is no mere accident.  On the contrary, it is
predictable, given the related distributions of economic resources and political
power in these countries.  The explanation for this inequity can be understood in
the context of public choice theory, which provides a positive model of what the
                        
     
5 The discussion in this section is from Birdsall and James (1993).7
government will do, under the assumption that the chief agents act to maximize
individual utility rather than social welfare.
6  According to the theory,
politicians and bureaucrats do not seek to optimize economic efficiency but rather
to maximize their own chances of getting reelected and staying employed; similarly,
individuals use governments to maximize their own income by creating and protecting
market positions and capturing publicly-financed services and transfers.
                        
     
6 This "public choice" approach (see Buchanan, Tollinson, and Tullock, 1980) is sometimes referred
to as "new political economy" (NPE).
Politicians and political parties have some discretionary power because of
barriers to entry and because they are in a position to shape as well as respond to
people's tastes and preferences.  As the same time, they must act in a way that
deters threats from potential competitors, and this limits the scope of their
monopoly power.  Where democracy does not exist in developing countries, a similar
process can occur with even fewer political checks on the use of government
resources to benefit the already powerful.
The allocation of resources resulting from public choice politics is often
inefficient, for several reasons:
 In a setting of imperfect information, people may not know the degree
and direction of redistribution going on.  If well-defined groups know
they are "losers" they are more likely to mobilize and foment
opposition to existing policies; therefore the "gainers" benefit from
perpetuating a "veil of ignorance".
 The real costs of publicly-produced goods may be above minimal levels,
because government imposes costs of bureaucracy and red-tape, often
lacks competitive pressures for internal efficiency, and uses
distortionary tax financing.
 The diversion of entrepreneurial energies toward extracting a surplus
from public agencies rather than toward productivity-enhancing market
activities can impede private sector efficiency and growth.
This is not to say that there will be no redistribution to poorer groups
under public choice theory.  The extremes of poverty and socio-economic immobility
may raise fears of crime or revolution which will ultimately hurt the rich;
historically, the provision of basic education, employment or medical insurance have
been ways of combatting these problems.  Also, since there are more poor people than
rich, the desire to constrain the popularity of opposition political groups in a
democracy leads to some redistribution to lower-income groups on grounds of
expediency.
The social services sectors, including health and education, are arenas in
which many of these forces play themselves out, as they involve a variety of quasi-
public goods with different mixes of public and private benefits.  The fact that
health and education services generate social as well as private benefits, and their8
frequent designation as "merit" goods provides justification for government
intervention along welfare theory lines.  Yet once this intervention begins,
ostensibly to correct for market failures and to benefit poor consumers, it is often
seized by producer groups and the allocation of resources diverted to a more private
service mix that predominantly benefits the rich.  While rhetoric stresses the
importance of avoiding price-rationing in order to preserve access for the poor and
thereby garner their political support, alternative rationing mechanisms emerge,
such as proximity to hospitals, knowledge of how to use the health system, and
selection tests for admission to free public universities which are equally income-
biased.
Three politically influential groups often work actively to protect the flow
of government funds toward health services that benefit them directly, and resisting
efforts to reallocate public resources for health to the poor.  First, government
officials and politicians stand to gain from construction projects for large
hospitals.  These major civil works are highly visible and popular, often seen by
the general public as evidence of government commitment to medical care.  At the
local level, they are seen as evidence of the commitment of local politicians to
local needs, and often of the ability of these politicians to command central
resources for local programs.  Those seeking reelection will point to new hospitals
as among their major accomplishments.  High-ranking civil servants also benefit
disproportionately from access to free medical services in these major hospital
facilities.  At the extreme, many developing countries allow senior officials and
their families to obtain sophisticated medical care abroad, in Europe or North
America, at government expense.  Such medical "evacuations" may even have a line in
the ministry of health budget.
Second, various middle-income consumer groups object strongly to any erosion
of their public subsidies for health services.  These groups include professionals
from the private sector and labor organizations.  British colonial policies in Ghana
and Zambia, for example, dictated that public hospitals in Accra and Lusaka,
respectively, should provide free or heavily subsidized medical care to the colonial
elites.  Once established, it has been extremely difficult for policy-makers in
those countries to shift this demand for medical care to private hospitals or to
charge full costs to the wealthy for care in the government teaching hospitals. 
Labor unions seek to protect public subsidies in the middle-income countries of
Latin America, where governments extend financial support to social security-based
health care through some combination of tax relief, public contributions to
insurance premiums, and direct budgetary transfers to social security agencies
(Mesa-Lago, 1991).  This social-security based care benefits only those in the
formal sector.
7
Third, the health workers and their respective labor organizations themselves
are a major source of resistance to change.  A shift in public funding to basic care
would require that doctors and nurses be redeployed from large urban-based hospitals
to smaller peripheral facilities in poor urban neighborhoods and rural areas. 
Living and working conditions in these may well be more difficult than in the
central hospitals; it is thus not surprising that health workers oppose these
changes.  Similarly, a reallocation of government spending for health would reduce
the demand for publicly-financed services from medical specialists.  The
                        
     
7  Several countries in Latin America, including Costa Rica, discussed below, and Brazil, have
recently extended some forms of social security-based care, such as emergency hospital services, to
all, in an effort to eliminate at least the most glaring forms of a two-tier system.  Colombia is
currently studying this option.9
specialists, through their professional associations, can be vocal and influential
lobbyists for continued spending on sophisticated equipment (such as diagnostic
imaging machines) and hospital facilities.   As Hausmann (1993) points out in the
case of Venezuela, "(Public sector) budgets have become an entitlement of producers,
not the purchase of a service on behalf of consumers....Centralization breeds
unionization and the consequence is a bilateral monopoly in which the government is
bound to be the weaker member and will compromise the future to get over the
present".
For the above pattern of public subsidies to dominate, it is not necessary
that all politicians and officials pursue only their own individual interests, nor
that service providers and middle-class consumers have complete control of public
revenue and expenditure patterns.
8  It is only necessary that these tendencies occur
widely enough and often enough to minimize countervailing efforts to reach the poor
-- that is, to prevent what we have referred to above as "swimming against the
tide".
                        
     
8  Toye (  ), for example, in a lengthy discussion of the NPE, argues that many leaders have
demonstrated powerful social consciences, and that the idea of the state as embodying common social
goals has and will continue to affect resource allocation patterns.10
The more equal the overall distribution of income, and the stronger the
political voice of the poor, the easier it should be to design and implement pro-
poor programs.  And indeed, as discussed below, pro-poor bias has and can emerge,
particularly in countries with relatively low income-inequality or political systems
which rely on the bottom third of the income distribution to maintain political
legitimacy.  Malaysia and Costa Rica, discussed below, as well as Sri Lanka, Korea,
and the Indian state of Kerala, are examples of economies with relatively low income
inequality and histories of broad-based social programs to reach the poor. 
Communist countries, including China and Cuba, are examples of economies in which
the political legitimacy of the ruling party has relied heavily on support of the
working and peasant classes.  Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and
Malaysia area also examples of countries in which political leaders, in the face of
external and internal communist threats in the post-war period, employed a variety
of mechanisms to ensure that urban workers and the rural poor shared in economic
growth.  These mechanisms included public housing programs (Hong Kong and
Singapore), extensive investment in rural infrastructure (Indonesia and Thailand),
land reform (Korea and Taiwan), and heavy emphasis on universal access to basic
health services and primary education.
9  In all these countries of East Asia, the
political situation required some swimming against the tide.  These as well as other
examples discussed below demonstrate that the public choice view of the world need
not and does not always dominate.
Section 4.  Strategies for Reform Section 4.  Strategies for Reform Section 4.  Strategies for Reform Section 4.  Strategies for Reform
Faced with these powerful forces that maintain an inequitable distribution of
public resources for health, some countries such as Costa Rica, Malaysia, and
Zimbabwe have nevertheless achieved greater equity.  How have they done so?  We
argue below that certain kinds of macroeconomic policies and political arrangements
are important in determining a country's successful equity orientation in the health
sector.  We then point to the specific strategies and policy and program instruments
that some developing countries have adopted to enhance equity in health.
Macroeconomic and political determinants  One fact stands out from the
beginning: the countries that have been most successful in achieving equity have
experienced moderate to high economic growth rates, and have been able to tap that
expanding resource base to improve health care for the population as a whole,
including the poor.  Such a "shared growth" policy stance ensures that all segments
of the population, including the poorest segments, benefit from and are able to
participate in their country's economic growth.  While growth does not automatically
lead to a redistribution of basic public services, it is extremely difficult to
achieve such a redistribution without it.  Ghana, Peru, and Zambia are examples of
countries that suffered from stagnating or even declining national income in the
1970s and 80s.  During this period, government spending for health was severely
constrained.  There was no incremental public funding for health that might have
been allocated to primary care for the poor.
By contrast, Costa Rica's economy grew at an average of nearly 6 percent a
year in the 1970s and by 3 percent in the 1980s.  Malaysia did even better, growing
at average of 7 percent a year during the two decades.  Zimbabwe grew by 6 percent
annually in the first half of the 1980s, when the government's redistributive
efforts in health were most vigorously pursued (World Bank, 1992b).  Other countries
                        
     
9  For discussion of this approach to "shared growth" in East Asia, see World Bank (1993c).  For
the implications of income inequality, see Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot (1994).11
that made strong advances in improving equity in health, such as Chile, China, and
Korea, have also been among the fastest growing economies in the developing world.
As mentioned above in the previous section, political dynamics have been a
key factor in those developing countries that have moved strongly toward, or
struggled to maintain, equity in health.  These pro-poor political forces take
different forms, including the post-independence drive to redress earlier
discrimination, as in Zimbabwe, and the search for legitimacy by a modernizing
authoritarian regime, as in Korea (and in Chile, too?).  In Malaysia, the
government's consistently progressive approach to health was prompted by its
objective of assisting the relatively disadvantaged ethnic majority and maintaining
its important political base in the country's rural areas, where lower-income
households are concentrated.
In Zimbabwe, the main impetus for change was national independence and
majority democratic rule, starting in 1980.  The newly-independent government
recognized that its political support came from low-income rural households that had
previously been disenfranchised.  Members of these rural households had joined the
guerilla movements that fought against the previous regime.  The new government
sought to reward their supporters and to redress earlier imbalances favoring the
urban middle-class, by investing heavily in the rehabilitation and construction of
over 500 health centers, in the training of thousands of nurses to staff these
facilities, and in basic programs of immunization, antenatal care, and infectious
disease control.  There was a concomitant decision to place a moratorium on new
investments in the central hospitals, which had benefitted mainly the urban
populations and especially the country's white minority.
At the same time that these governments shifted health spending toward the
poor, they explicitly sought to preserve existing high quality health services for
middle and upper-income groups, thus maintaining broad political support for their
reform efforts.  In Zimbabwe, the two highest quality tertiary care hospitals, in
Harare and Bulawayo, respectively, received generous operating budgets from the
government during the 1980s, even though new capital spending was severely
restricted.  At the end of the decade, the two hospitals still accounted for over
10 percent of the Ministry of Health budget.  In Costa Rica and Malaysia, middle-
class families continued to have access to well funded health care in public
facilities, even as coverage was extended to poor households.  And the wealthy
enjoyed the choice of opting out of the public system and utilizing private health
care with its associated amenities -- services financed privately with private
insurance and/or out-of-pocket payments, and not with public funds.
Instruments for promoting equity  In this political environment favorable to
more equitable access to health services and to more equitable distribution of
public resources for health, the pro-equity governments have used several
instruments to achieve this objective.  First, at the same time that the wealthy
were encouraged to shift much of their consumption of health services to the private
sector, these governments have sought consciously to reduce, eliminate, or
altogether avoid public subsidies to private financing and delivery of health care
to the better-off.  These subsidies can take many "hidden" forms, including
government budget transfers to social security-based insurance and tax deductions
on employer and employer contributions to insurance schemes.  In Zimbabwe, the
government has gradually reduced large subsidies to the better-off by cutting down
their deductions from income tax for premiums paid to private health insurance.  In
Costa Rica, the wealthy must contribute to the social security-based health fund,
even if they are served by private doctors and hospitals.
Second, pro-poor governments have targeted public spending toward health
interventions and facilities serving primarily, but not exclusively, the poor. 12
Zimbabwe's focus on rural health facilities and district hospitals is a good example
of this type of targeting using simple geographical criteria.  Costa Rica's emphasis
on basic primary and preventive care -- immunizations, control of diarrheal disease,
safe childbirth services -- in the 1970s also effectively targeted the poor, who
suffered greater disease burden from vaccine-preventable illnesses, diarrhea, and
childbirth complications than did the rich.  At the same time, these primary and
preventive services also benefitted the middle-class and wealthy, thus helping to
maintain political support for these initiatives.
Third, at least in the case of middle-income countries, equitable access and
public spending for health have been pursued through the effective universalization
of health insurance. In Costa Rica, for example, the democratically-elected
government decided in the early 1980s to expand the social security-based health
system to the entire population.  This meant covering the 20 percent of Costa Ricans
who had not previously been covered, and especially the poor.  Such a decision
required the government to subsidize health services for the poor, since their
employment-based contributions to the social security fund would not be large enough
to meet the cost of services for them.  At the same time, ministry of health and
social security hospitals were unified, and all Costa Ricans became eligible for
care in the same public hospitals, managed by the social security agency.
Improved equity in health through the universalization of insurance was also
the course followed by Korea during the 1980s.  In less than 10 years, the Korean
government created a comprehensive national health insurance system from scratch,
forging together several hundred regional and industry-based social insurance funds
(modeled on the German "sickness funds").  To achieve truly universal coverage, the
government chose to subsidize the insurance funds for the roughly 8 percent of the
population that is disabled or indigent (Yang, 1991).
Chile has also pursued greater equity in health in recent years by
establishing a single national health fund (FONASA), into which both payroll
deductions for social insurance and a general revenue subsidy for health care are
deposited.  All Chileans are eligible for health care financed from the FONASA,
whether in the form of payment vouchers to private service providers or capitated
and diagnostic-related payments to public sector providers.  In this way, Chile has
managed to reach the roughly 15 percent of the population that until recently was
not covered by social insurance (Bossert, 1992).
The successful experience of these reforming countries reveals several
important lessons for other developing countries: the need for sustained economic
growth to underpin policies for reallocation of public financing; the crucial
political conditions that allow for fuller and more equal participation by all
segments of the population; and the use of a gradual approach in which services for
the wealthy and middle-class are not undercut, even when the share of public
spending for these groups is declining.
These examples of successful countries also show that maintaining a more
egalitarian health system is a constant struggle to "swim against the tide".  There
are always interests that would skew essential health services and public funds for
health away from the poor.  In Costa Rica and in Zimbabwe, for example, pressures
from government doctors to concentrate in the main tertiary hospitals in the largest
cities and to acquire complex diagnostic equipment have only been partially
resisted.
China is a good example of a country where the tide has been so strong in
recent years that important egalitarian features of the health system have been
eroded.  In the 1960s and 1970s, China experienced one of the most dramatic advances
in health of any developing country: child mortality, for example, declined from 210
to 85 per 1000 live births between 1960 and 1975.  Much of this progress was due to13
broad-based provision of public health services in the areas of insect vector
control, immunization, improved hygiene, and family planning (Jamison, 1985), backed
by well-targeted public spending.  At the same time, China's unique rural health
insurance system, which covered about 500 million persons in the 1970s, guaranteed
adequate funding for basic clinical services (e.g., treatment of tuberculosis and
respiratory infections and safe pregnancy and delivery care)  throughout the
country.  As an unfortunate consequence of China's economic liberalization program
of the past decade, government funding for public health has declined and the rural
insurance system has now largely disintegrated.  A recent study (World Bank, 1992c)
suggests that these new health policies have made the distribution of government
spending for health in China more unequal and may be contributing to an increased
incidence of easily treatable diseases such as tuberculosis.
The experience of the few reforming countries and of the much larger number
of countries that have not yet shifted the balance of public resources for health
toward low-income groups also points to the many serious obstacles to equity-
oriented reforms.  Politically- influential groups that stand to lose from a change
in the status quo will block changes.  Achieving lasting reforms requires a
combination of political enfranchisement, skillful coalition-building and
negotiations, and enlightened leadership.
The generation and dissemination of information -- for example, on
differences in health status, service utilization, total health spending and
government expenditures among different income groups in a given country -- can be
a crucial element in achieving reforms that improve equity.  Policy-relevant
information becomes an especially powerful force for change in societies with
democratic political institutions, a broadly-educated population, and a diverse and
critical press.  Under these circumstances, the analysis of health spending levels
and patterns across geographical and income groupings can be a potent tool in the
hands of reformers, and can be used to counteract the efforts of others (e.g.,
politicians in power, elite civil servants, professional associations) to obtain a
disproportionate share of public resources for health.  This has been the case in
Chile and in some OECD countries such as the Netherlands where equity-enhancing
health reforms are currently taking place.
The international community can play a catalytic role in this process of
change, by providing information and extending financing to soften the transitional
costs of reform.  External development agencies have stimulated information
dissemination and debate on equity issues in health through their sponsorship of
sectoral studies and policy seminars.  Recent donor-supported studies of government
spending for the social sectors in countries as geographically diverse as Indonesia,
Kenya, and Uruguay are helping to shape the health policy debate in each of these
countries.  When these studies are embedded within broader country "public
expenditure reviews" that analyze both the incidence of taxation and spending, as
in Argentina and the Philippines, they further enrich the debate.
Financial backing from development institutions has also facilitated and
strengthened equity-oriented health reforms.  In Costa Rica, the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank have financed improvements in the Ministry of
Health and the social insurance agency that are designed to sustain the country's
long-standing emphasis on primary care for all population groups, including the
poor, and to ensure that all workers contribute their stipulated share of social
insurance costs.  In Zimbabwe, a coalition of European bilateral donors and the
World Bank have helped to finance a substantial share of public investments in
community and clinic-based services for poor rural groups.  These international
institutions and others should continue to support public policies and programs for
improved equity in the health sector in developing countries.  In the end of the14
day, however, the impetus for sustained reform will come mainly from within the
developing countries themselves.Bibliography
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